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I argue that the validity of the Stoic conception of the singular soul, empirically and psychologically, creates 
a view that is paradoxical: if being happy is the end for the sake of which everything is done, and if this 
consists in living according to virtue, using only right reasoning, one cannot obtain happiness. Why? 
Because selecting using right reasoning is the only virtue leading to the end, obtaining things that right 
reasoning is aimed at is ethically insignificant. I reconstruct fragments of text written by the outlaw Stoic 
philosopher, Posidonius, and interpret them to show how one can obtain the end while preserving Stoic 
ethics, through a radical connection between the soul consisting as parts and the passions. In this paper, I 








The Stoics are legendary for their treatment of emotions in human cognitive 
psychology. In fact, according to the Stoics in order for a person to live a good life, 
referred to as the end, one must be completely dissolute of the passions. Although all 
Stoic figures were in agreement about the utility of emotions, there was controversy of 
how the passions could be explained both psychologically and physiologically. Debates 
gave rise to the question of whether emotions are direct causes of faulty judgments, or 
are overpowering physical dispositions of the soul. This essay will detail the differences 
surrounding the two most contentious treatments of the passions, between Chrysippus 
and Posidonius, with an eye towards explaining how these opposing positions effect 
how a good life may be achieved.   
 
To understand the treatment of the passions, the soul must first be investigated. 
According to most Stoic philosophers, the soul is a body that can act or be acted upon; 
it is a physiological combination of what is referred to as pneuma, a physical entity, 
consisting of air and fire spread throughout the body. In rational animals, the soul is the 
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reasoning faculty that is sustained by a power existing between air and fire; this power, 
referred to as tension, provides stability and substantiality to the soul; that is, balance. 
The soul is responsible for guiding us to live in accordance to our natural dispositions 
in the world; some of us, by practicing philosophy, are living according to our nature 
(Long and Sedley 1987, 282, 313). 
 
The generally accepted understanding of the passions, equivocal to the term emotions, 
is that they are excessive impulses that are experienced in the soul by the impressions 
that are received from perceptions of objects in the world. The commanding faculty of 
the soul is believed to move towards or away from objects, in accordance to what 
appears good or bad. These movements are referred to as primary and secondary 
emotions: appetite and fear, pleasure and distress, respectfully. For example, appetite 
arises when things appear to be good or desirable; fear from objects that appear bad. 
Moreover, pleasure results from obtaining those things that appear good and retreating 
from those things that appear bad. Distress results from either not obtaining what 
appear good, or experiencing things that appear bad (Long and Sedley 1987, 410, 411).   
 
Chrysippus, known as the leading Stoic philosopher, adopted this general view of the 
passions. He regarded the soul as an inclusive and unified whole and argued that it is 
solely responsible for the false beliefs that result in excessive impulses. Excessive 
impulses, he argued, are the passions. Furthermore, when rational humans experience 
the passions, they have made faulty judgments of what is truly good or bad. For 
example, death was not considered to be truly bad according to Stoic doctrines, but 
having the belief that death is to be feared, is a false judgment. False judgments cause 
excessive impulses that pull the soul in opposing directions, towards good and bad 
(Long and Sedley 1987, 410, 412, 413, ).  
 
Chrysippus describes the movement of the soul as a fluttering; a swift motion that 
changes rapidly. When a rational animal has excessive impulses, the fluttering in 
different directions towards good and bad, cause the tension in the soul to weaken and 
the soul is thrust into a state of constant and rapid vice. Chrysippus describes this state 
as: “[…] [P]eople overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses. […] 
When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not 
excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever 
he wants to. But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no 
longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are 
carried away and unable to change obediently […].” Thus, when a person judges 
something incorrectly, impulses towards or away from that object take over and inhibits 
the soul’s power to deliberate and correct the judgment of whether something is truly 
good or bad (Long and Sedley 1987, 414). 
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On the other hand, Posidonius draws account of the soul from Plato’s Republic IV; 
wherein Plato argues that the soul is not one whole, but must consist as tripartite. 
Whereas Plato named the parts of the soul: logical, high spirited, and appetite, 
Posidonius defined the soul’s parts: rationality, competitive, and appetite. These parts, 
he argued, are physical dispositions and movements that happen within the entire space 
of the body. The competitive part of the soul resides in the chest of a person; those who 
have higher body temperatures and wider chests are disposed more towards anger, such 
as jealousy or an attitude towards injustice. Appetite is located in the belly, which is 
attracted and pulled towards things that appear to be desirable, such as being thirsty and 
hungry. Rationality, which is located within the head, always and consistently 
maintains its full virtuous rational powers; when it is properly developed, it regulates 
the balance in the soul (Long and Sedley 1987, 415(65M)). 
 
Posidonius attributes the passions having risen as a result of the mixture of the souls 
parts. Posidonius details this inner struggle: “[Some people] do not know that having 
pleasure and dominating one’s neighbours are the objects desired by the brutish part of 
the soul, but wisdom and everything good and honourable are the objects desired by the 
part which is rational and divine.” Posidonius argues that when a person experiences 
the passions there is a physiological struggle happening between the rational soul and 
the brutish parts of the soul; what results is the rational part being overpowered and 
conquered. Thus, according to Posidonius, the rational part of the soul is dismissed of 
any responsibly of directly giving rise to the passions (Long and Sedley 1987, 
414,415,416(65KMP)). 
 
On the other hand, Chrysippus’s treatment of the passions places full ethical 
responsibility on the single, mature, rational soul. He believed that once a human infant 
passes outside of the womb, it is capable of possessing a soul, then at the age of seven, 
develops beliefs that form right reasoning. He further argued that the passions are false 
beliefs that lead to excessive impulses towards obtaining things that appear desirable. 
Thus, because the single soul gives rise to the passions, it is responsible for controlling 
its emotions. However, many philosophers object to this view, most notably Plato; he 
states: “[Isn’t] the expression “self-control” ridiculous? The stronger self that does the 
controlling is the same as the weaker self that gets controlled, so that only one person is 
referred to in all such expressions.” Plato seems to indicate that it puzzling how one 
singular soul can overpower itself. What is more, Posidonius objected to Chrysippus’s 
view through empirical observations that children under the age of seven, as well as 
some non-human animals, seem to experience emotions. Thus, a fully rational soul is 
not necessary for some non-human animals and children to experience the passions 
(Graver 2007, 75-76) (Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2011, 467). 
 
Plato wrote in Republic IV, “It is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do 
or undergo opposites in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same 
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time.” It is contradictory for a singular soul to have opposing beliefs. Yet, Posidonius 
argues that if beliefs and emotions are in a singular soul, they should not be at odds. 
However, he argues that beliefs and emotions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
He argued that a person could have a false belief about something but fail to experience 
emotions. For example: a person may have a corrupt opinion that a terrorist attack is 
likely, but not experience fear. Also, some humans can have an emotion with no 
explanation of having a belief; such as when a person experiences a sudden onset of 
tears while listening to a symphony or while standing in front of a astounding piece of 
artwork, but has no causal explanation for the emotion. Furthermore, according to 
Chrysippus’s argument, an unchanging belief should produce an unchanging 
subsequent emotion. However, Posidonius points out that some rational beings can 
have a belief, but experience significantly decreased emotions over time; for example: a 
person may hold a false belief throughout their life that the death of their son is bad, but 
experience deteriorating emotions as time passes. Thus, according to Posidonius, it 
seems likely that the passions are not exclusively attached to beliefs; rather they are 
only in relation to the part of the soul that contains the power of belief (Graver 2007, 
78) (Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2011, 472). 
 
Chrysippus may have responded to Posidonius’s critiques by maintaining a position 
that non-human animals and infant portrayal of emotions are not genuine. Rather, they 
may be what was referred to by some Stoics as pre-emotions. Pre-emotions may also 
affect mature humans with fully rational souls. For example: a woman may be startled 
from what sounds to be a gunshot and experiences fear. However, her soul can 
deliberate and is able to correct her faulty judgment and form a correct belief that it was 
not a gunshot, but a vehicle that backfired (being neither bad nor something to be 
feared). Pre-emotions in rational animals are subject to delayed, corrected judgments, 
whereas non-rational animals and infants only experience the pre-emotion state of the 
soul (Graver 2007, 77,78).  
 
Furthermore, Chrysippus may have addressed the claim against diminished emotions, 
by attributing time as a factor affecting fresh beliefs and emotions. Chrysippus states: 
“For the [impression] printing [on the soul] should not be taken to be like that of a 
signet-ring, since it is impossible for there to be many such prints at the same time 
affecting the same subject.” According to Chrysippus impressions experienced in the 
world are imprinted upon the soul, with a particular time stamp, and those impressions 
that are most near to the present soul are fresh. As a person ages, their belief may 
remain constant, but other impressions and emotions are continually stamped upon the 
soul, and prior beliefs lose their fresh position nearest to the present soul. As a result 
the subsequent impulses of emotions can be significantly reduced, but never eradicated 
as long as the belief remains the same (Graver 2007, 78) (Long and Sedley 1987, 
236(39A3)). 
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Perhaps the most significant difference between Chrysippus and Posidonius, is how the 
treatment of the passions affects how a person obtains what is the most important end 
in life; happiness. In order for a person to be happy, the Stoics argued that a rational 
person must exercise right reasoning in accordance with nature. In general, the Stoics 
believed that the act of selecting using right reasoning is the only true good in life; 
actually obtaining the targets of reasoning is of no real importance. For instance, what 
is most important for happiness, for an archer, is performing appropriately, utilizing 
their power to the best of their ability to shoot a bow; whether one actually strikes a 
bulls-eye is not important. Chrysippus accepted this treatment of happiness; whereas 
Posidonius presented an inconsistency arising from this position. He argued that 
obtaining the target is logically as significant as the power of selecting using right 
reasoning (Long and Sedley 1987, 401(64A)).  
 
Posidonius argued against Chrysippus’s treatment of happiness because the act of 
reasoning does not logically seem to be of any significant value without the targets that 
provide the soul its power to select. Posidonius states, “If someone were to say that an 
archer does everything in his power not for the sake of hitting the target but for the sake 
of doing everything in his power, one would suppose him to be speaking in a riddling 
and fantastic way.” For example: without a target with a bulls-eye, there would be no 
use of a bow and arrow, and the archer would have no awareness of an intended 
purpose to use their aiming skills. According to Posidonius, it seems that reasoning 
necessarily came into existence for the sake of desiring targets, since without targets 
there would be no object for the soul to apply right reasoning upon. Thus, reasoning 
seems dependent on targets, indicating a direct relationship, whereas the target must be 
valued, at the least, as beneficial as selecting using right reasoning. Therefore, it seems 
logical that the end goal in life is two-fold, both obtaining the target and selecting using 
right reasoning (Long and Sedley 1987, 402(64E7,8,9,10,11)). 
 
Posidonius indicates that according to Chrysippus’s doctrine, using reasoning to act 
according to what one desires, without actually obtaining the target, destroys the act of 
reasoning, “since it does everything for the sake of getting what is not important […].” 
Yet, Chrysippus and Posidonius, as well as all other Stoic philosophers, are unwilling 
to assent to obtaining targets because this would destroy the Stoic doctrines of ethics. 
That is, if obtaining targets were important, physical benefits such as health and wealth, 
would be just as valuable as the soul’s virtue. The Stoics believed that only the soul 
survives after the physical body and is born again and again in cosmic cycles. Thus, it 
does not seem appropriate that equivocal value could be placed on physical or targeted 
benefits, since they are not eternal. Thus, the Stoics had a strong metaphysical 
discipline, focusing on the virtue of rationality (Long and Sedley 1987, 402).  
 
Chrysippus’s doctrine of living a good and virtuous life is described as one’s unified 
soul that selects, using right reasoning, towards obtaining happiness. Selecting can be in 
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the form of using a power, such as an archer selects their power in shooting a bow, or 
selecting whether a drink is good or bad. Virtuous selecting is believed to make a 
person happy. However, virtue is in selecting, not obtaining, as detailed above. Yet, 
Chrysippus’s argument seems to create a paradox; how can one be happy without 
actually obtaining happiness? It is even more unclear how one could have knowledge 
of right reasoning, without comparing it to a successful attempt of obtaining a target. 
For example: how would an archer know that they are performing to the best of their 
ability without comparing their efforts, at least once, towards actually hitting their 
target (Long and Sedley 1987, 402(64C10))?  
 
Chrysippus argued that in order to live a good life one must be happy, whereas 
Posidonius argues that to live a good life one must be free from the passions. Although 
happiness and freedom from the passions infer the same thing, there are important 
differentiations that set them apart. Both Stoic figures believed that virtue was created 
and perpetuated by right reasoning; and, right reasoning must necessarily be free from 
false judgments. Subsequently, false judgments are considered to be the passions. 
Accordingly, the target for leading a good life, according to Posidonius, is ultimately 
freedom from the passions. If Posidonius’s account is correct, then Chrysippus’s 
argument will not provide a salient way to accomplish a virtuous soul, since not 
obtaining the target of freedom from the passions would contradict selecting using right 
reasoning. Chrysippus may respond that if one were to exercise right reasoning in all 
cases, then freedom from the passions would be entailed in the selecting. Still, it is 
undeniable that if this were the case, the target would necessarily always be obtained, 
which as detailed above, seems to indicate an equivocal and contingent significance. 
And, no Stoic was willing to assent to the significance of obtaining targets. What is 
more, if the target is always obtained in the selecting, it could be said that right 
reasoning produces freedom from the passions. Furthermore, it can be empirically 
observed that right reasoning does not always produce or entail its targets (Long and 
Sedley 1987, 405). 
 
Posidonius observed that some targets are not necessarily obtained, despite using right 
reasoning. For example: one might have right reasoning selecting healthy things, but 
never obtain healthiness. If the soul were one in the same, then it should not be at odds 
with itself; that is, a soul cannot be both healthy and ill. Where I see clarification of this 
point is through Plato Republic IV, in which he states, “Knowledge of health or disease 
isn’t healthy or diseased, and knowledge of good and bad doesn’t itself become good or 
bad.” Plato seems to indicate that right reasoning does not become freedom from the 
passions, but rather right reasoning is a particular knowledge about the passions, only 
made possible when the soul is treated in parts. Posidonius states: “Once the cause of 
the emotions was seen, it resolved this absurdity. It revealed the origins of the 
maladjustment in what should be sought and avoided, defined the procedures of 
training, and solved the difficulties regarding the impulse that arises from emotion. 
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Living as a student of the truth and order of the whole, and helping to promote this as 
far as possible, completely uninfluenced by the irrational part of the soul.” What 
Posidonius indicates is that the virtuous rational part of the soul does not seek to obtain 
separation from the passion parts of the soul, since it is already, at the onset, treated as 
such. Being free from the passions is knowledge in the rational part of the soul about 
what gives rise to emotions and impulses in the brutish parts of the soul, and it being 
made stronger through that knowledge in order to overpower and regain tensile balance. 
This approach appears to fulfill both Chrysippus and Posidonius’s ethical doctrines that 
eternal virtue is in right reasoning, and not in obtaining targets (Long and Sedley 1987, 
405(64I6)) (Cohen, Curd and Reeve 2011, 475). 
 
Through Posidonius’s method, with support from Plato, it has been shown how actually 
obtaining the target is of no real significance, than using right reasoning; honoring the 
ethical positions of all Stoic philosophers. By separating the soul into parts, 
Posidonius’s argument escapes the dilemmas faced by Chrysippus; the problem of 
overpowering one’s own self, the necessary contingency of obtaining targets, and the 
empirical observations that beliefs and emotions are not mutually exclusive. Right 
reasoning is then a particular knowledge about the target, and knowledge is power. A 
rationality that has been trained by education and experience can correct faulty 
judgments through understanding what is truly good, or what is not to be feared. Being 
happy through recognizing what is truly good is what the Stoics meant by living in 
accordance to nature. Despite the paths that led them in different directions, both 
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